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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GLEN M. BARNEY & SONS, INC., :
and the STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 16020

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
and ROBERT LAMAR JENSEN,
Defendants.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Robert LaMar Jensen filed a claim for compensation
with the Industrial Commission of Utah on January 26, 1977,
wherein he alleged he was injured by accident in the course
and scope of his employment on October 20, 1976.

In this

application he alleged that at the time of his injury he was an
employee, for compensation purposes, of both Chris Patton,
doing business as Western Express,
"Patton")

(hereinafter referred to as

and Glen M. Barney & Sons, Inc.

to as "Barney").

(hereinafter referred

Barney denied the existence of any employment

relationship with the applicant at the time of his injury.
DIPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Following a formal hearing before Administrative Law
Judge Keith E. Sohm on May 12, 1977, an Order was entered finding
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.

joint liability on the
part of
and Barney.
Machine-generated
OCR, Patton
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The State

Insurance Fund, as compensation carrier for Barney, filed a
timely Motion for Review of this Order with the Industrial
Commission, which Motion was denied by a divided vote of the
commissioners, with the only law trained member of the Commission dissenting on the issue of Barney's liability.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant respectfully request that the Order of the
commission regarding the liability of Barney be affirmed.

Defendant agrees with plaintiff's Statement of Facts
but supplements the same with the following:
There were 22 trucks and 40 to 44 drivers of Patton.
(R.

52)

Duane Branch was the immediate supervisor and only

employee of Patton present other than drivers.

Glen Barney

or one of his employees at the loading site did the dispatching.

I

I

(R. 52)

Bill of ladings were signed "Barney" and the truck number.!

(R.53)

The bill of ladings listed "Glen M. Barney and Sons"

as the carrier.

(R.53)

Barney at the weigh

The signed tickets were returned to

station.

(R.53)

Logs were made out in the

name of "Western Express" but later were changed to list "Barney"
as the carrier.

All logs were turned into "Barney".

It was under

the direction of either the person running the loader or else
Craig Barney that you received instruction and direction as to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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when you loaded, and how and at what end of the pile. (R.56)
Lining up to load was under the direction of Barney.

(R.57)

There is only one route to Page, Arizona and return.

(R.76)

A copy of the contract between Barney and Patton was in the truck
at all times.

(R.80)

Jensen was instructed or understood that

"whenever you're leased to a company, the person you are leased
to is the boss and they do have control over the vehicle as
long as it's leased to them."

(R.99)

Jensen understood that Mr.

Barney had the vehicle under lease, and he was to take orders
from him if he gave them.

(R.99)

for bankruptcy on April 17, 1978.

Western Express, Inc. filed
(R.l49)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF A STATUTORY
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND
PLAINTIFF UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-1-42
(2) U.C.A.,l953, AS AMENDED.
Defendant concedes that plaintiff was not the common
law employee of Barney.

Defendant also will concede that under

the provisions of Section 35-1-42 (2) U.C.A.,l953, in defining
the ordinary and usual employment relationship,ie. "(2) Every .•.
private corporation ••.. having in service one or more workmen ...
under any contract of hire ...• oral or written," is an employer
within the meaning of the Act, does not make defendant an employee.
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Defendant contends that here the plaintiff was a
statutory employer within the meaning of the last paragraph
of the above statute.

Section 35-1-42(2) U.C.A.,l953 provides

in the final paragraph:
"Where any employer procures any work to be
or in part by a contractor over whose work
he retains supervision or control, and such work
is a part or process in the trade or business of
the employer, such contractor, and all persons employed
by him, and all subcontractors under him, and all
persons employed by any such subcontractors, shall
be deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees of such original employer. Any person, firm
or corporation engaged in the performance of work as
an independent contractor shall be deemed an employer
within the meaning of this section. The term "independent contractor", as herein used is defined to be any
person, association or corporation engaged in the
performance of any work for another, who, while so
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that
pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject
to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged
only in the performance of a definite job or piece
of work, and is subordinate to the employer only
in effecting a result in accordance with the employer's
design." (Emphasis added)
~wholly

There is no question but what Barney is the "employer"
who procured the work (transporting coal) to be done by a
"contractor"

(Patton) and that such work was a part or process

of the trade or business of Barney.

Barney was hauling coal

under contract from Salina to Page, Arizona.

There is also no

dispute that the defendant was the employee of Patton.

There-

fore, if there be sufficient evidence to show that Barney had
retained "supervision or control" over either Patton or defendant,
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the defendant becomes the "employee of such original employer"
(Barney)

and is entitled to benefits from the plaintiff.
A review of the record shows the following:
Western Express had 40 to 44 truck drivers and 20

to 22 trucks with one supervisor on the job who was the only
non-driver present.

(R.S2)

Defendant testified on direct examina-

tion:
"q. What was your understanding of the position of
Duane Branch?
a.

He would be the immediate supervisor or the manager.

q. Was there a dispatcher, or anyone else, that told
the trucks when to go and come?
a. No.
It would be just at the loading site. It
would either be Glen Barney or ... (Further statement
unaudible to the reporter)" (R.52)
And later defendant testified:
"q. During the loading process, where did you load
actually?
a. At the railhead for Southern Utah Fuel, in Salina,
Utah.
q. Who told you how to get in and get out, and move
around the loading area?
a.
It was either the person running the loader, or
else craig Barney was over there quite often directing
it. So it would be under Southern Utah Fuel and
Barney's direction as to when you loaded, and how and
at what end of the pile.
q.

was Mr. Branch ever over there?

-5-
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a.

Not very often

q. Now were there any specific instructions about
the way in which you lined up?
a. Mainly to not, you know, get ahead of one of the
other trucks. Such as going in line and loading in
your turn."
(R. 56, 57)
And finally defendant testified under re-cross
examination "q. Mr. Jensen, you indicated earlier, when you
were asked about your employer, you said: "I knew
my direct employer was the owner of the truck."
You knew, of course, that the truck was leased to
Barney?
a.

Yes, sir.

q. And were you under the impression--or instructed-that, since the vehicle was leased to Mr. Barney,
that you were to take instructions from him as to
using it, if he might give some.
a. Yes, sir. That is standard procedure. Whenever
you are leased to a company, the person you're leased
to is the boss. They do have control over the vehicle
as long as it is leased to them.
q.

And you understood then, when you went to work-gather from Mr. Patton--that Mr. Barney had the
vehicle under lease, and that you were to take orders
from him if he gave them?
!

a.

Yes, sir.

That's standard knowledge on that.

q. You were also to take orders from Mr. Patton,
and his supervisor there at the scene if they were
given? Is that right?
a. Yes, sir. Or if Mr. Barney changed them, then
we'd follow his directions too."
(R.98,99)
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It must be noted here that Mr. Glen Barney was
present throughout the entire hearing, testified as to the identification of certain documents (R.l05) but did not testify in
contradiction to any of the testimony of the defendant.

It is

fair then to assume that the testimony of the defendant is not
only uncontroverted but represents in fact both certain actions
of direct control and implied control or the right to control
details of the contractors work or that of his employees.
Defendant agrees that the form lease offered as an
exhibit to establish the relationship between Barney and Patton
was viable and important evidence.

The lease also spelled out

certain restrictions and limitations of liability to the parties.
The contract also attempted to eliminate any possibility of the
"CARRIER" being the employer of either the "OWNER" or the
employees of the "OWNER".
In the case of Harry L. Young and Sons, Inc. v. Ashton,
538 P2d 316(1975), the same type of agreement was signed by
Ashton (the owner-lessee)

that Young was not the employer and

Ashton fully understood that Young did not employ any drivers.
rn that case the court did not have any di=ficulty in sustaining
the Commission's finding that Young was still the employer of
Ashton.

In the Young case the commission was more concerned

about the "exercise of control" or the "right to exercise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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control".
This court has said in Barnbrough v. Bethers, 552 P2d
1286,
"In determining who is the employer of an
employee, the right to control the employee's work
is dispositive of the question; the degree of control
actually exercised need not be great, so long as the
right exists."
This court has ruled in a number of cases concerning
third party liability under Section 35-1-62 u.c.A.,l953 that
most employees of sub-contractors are considered to be "in the
same employment" as the general contractor.

(Emphasis added)

Adamson v. Okland construction Co., 29 U. 2d 286, 508 P2d 805
held that an employee of an electrical subcontractor could not
sue the general contractor in tort liability because they
were "in the same emplovment".

(Emphasis added)

Where the general contractors right to
supervision or control over sub-contractor by
supervising the over-all continuity and integration
of work among various subcontractors, directing the
sequence of the work by the subcontractors, making
changes in the work done by them and ordering work
stoppages" were considered sufficient.
Section 35-1-62 U.C.A.,l953, provides in part:
"When any injury or death for which compensation
is payable under this title shall have been caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another person
not in the same employment, the injured employee or
in the case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured employee or his heirs or personai1
representative may also have an action for damages
against such third person----".
(Emphasis added)
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In construing the critical phrase - "in the
same employment" -this court in Smith v. Alfred Brown co.,
27 U. 2d 155, 493 P2d 994 had no difficulty in determining that
masonry work was a part or process of the trade or business of
a general contractor and that the general contractor exercised
sufficient control to place the employees of the masonry subcontractor "in the same employment" as the general contractor.
In Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 U 2d 139, 442 P2d 31,
this court spelled out the elements of control by the general
contractor - Gibbons and Reed.
"Defendant was told when to speed his trips
and when to back up to the traxcavator and when to
drive away, and he could not haul dirt in any other
manner than as he was told.

If the driver of the truck failed to maintain his
position in line, the foreman of Gibbons and Reed
could stop the truck from hauling."
On these and certain other statements the court coneluded that an employer-employee relationship existed between
Gallegos and Gibbons and Reed - sufficient to deny an action
based upon negligence by a third party sub-contractor.
In Sommerville v. Industrial Commission, 113 U 504,
196 P2d 718, the court affirmed that the crucial factor in
determining whether or not an applicant for workmens compensation
is an "employee" or an "independent contractor" is whether the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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person for whom services were performed had the right to control
the execution of the work.

This was confirmed in the case of

Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113 U 451, 196 P2d 502,
refining the former by saying the "extent of control is the
important test" in distinguishing between "employee" and

"indepen~

dent contractor".
In the earlier case of Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 U. 309, 172 P2d 136, the court held that the "existence
of a potential right to control is suf·ficient to create the
relationship even though the right is never exercised."
Applying this concept of either "control in fact" or
the "potential right to control" to the instant case, one is led
to the conclusion that both elements were in fact present.
The court is directed to the uncontradicted testimony
of the defendant that there was only one foreman or supervisor
from Patton present for the 40 to 44 drivers, that directions
were frequently if not mostly given by Barney or his employees,
that directions to line up and depart were given by Barney,
that Jensen understood Patton was his immediate employer but
that he was to take orders from Barney when or if they were given
and that all bills of lading, trip permits and paper work was
in the name of Barney.
The conclusion appears inescapable that there was
present under the working conditions at that time sufficient
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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exercise of control by Barney of the details of Patton's work
and sufficient control or right to control the actual work
of employees of Patton to make the defendant in this case
either an "employee in fact" or a "statutory employee" and thus
entitling the defendant to benefits from these plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's finding of statutory employment
based upon Section 35-1-42(2)

is amply supported by the record.

Defendant has met the burden of establishing the presence,
exercise and right to exercise control over both the activities
of this defendant and his emP.loyer as well.
Dated this

~~y of April,

1979.
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